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 Mind The Gap: Financial London and the Regional Class Pay Gap  
 
Abstract 
The hidden barriers, or ‘gender pay gap’, preventing women from earning equivalent 
incomes to men is well documented. Yet recent research has uncovered that, in 
Britain, there is also a comparable class-origin pay gap in higher professional and 
managerial occupations. So far this analysis has only been conducted at the national 
level and it is not known whether there are regional differences within the UK. This 
paper uses pooled data from the 2014 and 2015 Labour Force Survey (N=7534) to 
stage a more spatially-sensitive analysis that examines regional variation in the class 
pay gap. We find that this ‘class ceiling’ is not evenly spatially distributed. Instead it 
is particularly marked in Central London, where those in high-status occupations who 
are from working-class backgrounds earn, on average, £10,660 less per year than 
those whose parents were in higher professional and managerial employment. Finally, 
we inspect the Capital further to reveal that the class pay gap is largest within Central 
London’s banking and finance sector. Challenging policy conceptions of London as 
the ‘engine room’ of social mobility, these findings suggest that class disadvantage 
within high-status occupations is particularly acute in the Capital. The findings also 
underline the value of investigating regional differences in social mobility, and 
demonstrate how such analysis can unravel important and previously unrecognized 
spatial dimensions of class inequality.   
Keywords: class, region, class origin, class pay gap, class ceiling, social mobility 
Word length: 8357 
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Introduction 
Spatial inequality and intergenerational social mobility1 are both key sociological 
concerns yet are only rarely connected in empirical work (Savage 1988). To some 
extent this reflects a lack of sufficiently detailed data, but also particular disciplinary 
preoccupations. In social mobility studies, the dominant focus has remained firmly on 
the measurement of generalized rates of intergenerational mobility, which has 
generally presupposed a fixed national framing (Bukodi et al 2014; Goldthorpe and 
Mills 2008). In contrast, geographers, economists and sociologists interested in spatial 
patterns of inequality have tended to ignore issues of class origin and instead focus on 
the relationship between class destinations and residential segregation (Dorling 2012; 
Butler 2003) or migration and intra-generational social mobility (Fielding 1992; 
Findlay et al. 2009). Yet, as we argue here, connecting issues of space and 
intergenerational mobility is pivotal for better understanding the “long shadow” that 
class origins cast on life outcomes (Lareau 2015) and, more specifically, how this 
shadow manifests in different geographical contexts.  
 
This paper therefore represents the first systematic attempt to unravel regional 
differences in the patterning of social mobility in the UK. Specifically, it interrogates 
the thesis (Authors B and A, 2016) that even when those from working-class 
backgrounds are upwardly mobile into high-status occupations they face a powerful 
earnings ‘class ceiling’ that persists net of a variety of important predictors of 
earnings. We examine whether this ‘class origin pay gap’ operates equally throughout 
the UK, or whether it is concentrated in particular geographical work contexts. For 
example, does an upwardly mobile accountant working in Manchester face the same 
3 
 
hidden earnings barriers as an accountant from a similar background who works in 
Central London?  
Notably, our findings problematize the dominant policy narrative on regional social 
mobility in the UK, which presents London as the national ‘engine-room’ of social 
mobility (SMCP 2015; 2016). In contrast, we find Central London to be a site of 
particularly acute class-origin inequality within higher professional and managerial jobs. 
Not only are the upwardly mobile strikingly underrepresented within Central London’s 
top occupations, but once there these individuals face particularly severe earnings 
disadvantages. This stands in stark contrast to areas such as Manchester and East of 
England, which have almost non-existent class pay gaps. Finally we move to dissect the 
Capital further, demonstrating that the class origin pay gap is by far most acute among 
those working in banking and finance - pointing to a distinct spatial and sectoral apex to 
the class ceiling in contemporary Britain.    
 
High-Status Occupations and the ‘Class’ Ceiling 
Social mobility into Britain’s high-status occupations has long been a central research 
issue for academics and policymakers. In sociology, the middle of the 20th century saw a 
series of rich studies scrutinizing the class composition of particular elite occupations 
(Boyd 1973; Halsey and Crewe 1969). This tradition has continued in the policy domain 
where the last few decades have seen increasing calls for higher professional and 
managerial occupations to become more ‘open’ (SMCP 2010). This debate intensified 
following the publication of the Cabinet Office Panel for Fair Access to the Professions  
(2010), which argued forcefully that top occupations in Britain had become less 
accessible to those from working-class origins. This has since been strengthened by a 
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series of subsequent reports produced by the Social Mobility and Child Poverty 
Commission (SMCP), which have each renewed the policy objective of ‘opening up the 
top of British society’ (Ashley et al 2015).  
     
Curiously, this interest in occupational ‘fair access’ has rarely extended to British 
sociology. Instead, most sociologists have focused their attention on generalised rates 
of social mobility into the “big classes” of the National Statistics Socio-economic 
Classification (NS-SEC) and, more specifically, whether these rates are increasing or 
decreasing (see Authors A and B; Year B for further discussion of this debate).  
 
Occupationally-sensitive analyses have continued elsewhere. Economists, for 
example, have recently demonstrated a clear association between parents’ income and 
access to Britain’s top professions (Macmillan et al. 2014), and in US sociology 
important conceptual insights have emerged from the ‘micro-class’ approach to social 
mobility (Grusky 2005). This work has demonstrated that significant differences in 
mobility rates exist between individual occupational groups, which should be 
understood as distinct ‘micro-classes’ (Jonsson et al. 2009).  
One problem with both ‘big-class’ and ‘micro-class’ approaches, however, is that they 
conceptualise social mobility as a process captured by measuring occupational entry. Yet 
while those from working-class backgrounds may secure admission into high-status 
occupations, they do not necessarily enter with the same resources as those from more 
privileged backgrounds, and therefore do not necessarily achieve the same earnings or 
levels of success.  
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This is a question we have recently begun to take up in our own research (Authors A and 
B; Year A; Year B). Drawing on the feminist concept of the ‘glass ceiling’2, we 
demonstrate that even when those from working-class origins do enter high-status 
occupations in Britain, they have – on average - considerably lower incomes than 
colleagues from more privileged backgrounds. More specifically, examining the large-
sample Great British Class Survey (GBCS) and the nationally representative Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) we uncover a class-origin pay gap in both data sets within higher 
professional and managerial (NS-SEC 1) occupations.  In the 2014 LFS, for example, 
those who are not from professional or managerial backgrounds earn, on average, 17 per 
cent (or £7350) less annually than those from privileged backgrounds. This difference is 
partly explained by the upwardly mobile being employed in smaller firms, having lower 
educational qualifications, and working outside London, but it remains significant and 
substantial (9-12% or £4342 per year) even net of these and a variety of other important 
predictors of earnings, such as gender, ethnicity, age, and human capital. This illustrates 
very clearly that, even beyond entry, the upwardly mobile often face an earnings ‘class 
ceiling’ within Britain’s high-status occupations.  
One way to understand these findings is that the meaning and rewards of being in a high-
status job are not the same for people from different class backgrounds. However, it may 
also be that that the meaning and rewards of being in a high-status occupation, as well as 
the degree to which class origin is associated with earnings, varies geographically. 
Indeed, as we outline in the following section, a wealth of research suggests that class 
inequality in the UK has an important spatial dimension.   
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British Geographies of Class and Mobility 
In Britain understanding social class demands a sophisticated geographical lens. 
Historically, class formation has been highly regionally-specific and symbolically 
imagined along a ‘North-South Divide’ (Campbell 2004; Martin 2004; Thrift and 
Williams 2014). Such a division has also traditionally been synonymous with the 
boundary between the middle and working class – with an educated, middle class south 
counterposed to industrial, working-class heartlands in the north of England, Scotland 
and Wales. Of course the reality was always more complex than this and, as a number of 
authors have argued (Dorling 2012; Savage et al 2015), the dichotomy of north versus 
south is increasingly outdated and simplistic. Instead, in the context of the profound 
restructuring of the UK economy in recent decades, much research has instead 
demonstrated the increasing dominance of central London (Hamnett 2003) and, within 
the Capital, the spatial retreat of the ‘super-rich’ (Burrows 2013) or ‘wealth elites’ 
(Savage 2015).  Many others have noted growing urban class inequalities beyond London 
(Atkinson 2006; Butler 2003). In particular an extensive literature has explored socio-
spatial segregation within many major cities, with research on gentrification (Butler 
1997), geodemographic classifications (Burrows and Gane 2006), belonging (Benson 
2014; Savage et al. 2004), gated communities (Atkinson 2004) and ghettoization 
(Blokland and Savage 2008) , all insisting on the pivotal role of residential differentiation 
in marking out contemporary class division in Britain.    
 
While this literature on the ‘spatialisation of class’ is undoubtedly rich, there is a 
notable paucity of work examining space and class in the labour market, and 
specifically in terms of intergenerational occupational mobility. Unlike the US where 
there is now very detailed data on inter-regional variation in rates of mobility (Chetty 
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et al. 2014), large-scale mobility research in the UK is conducted almost exclusively 
at the national level.  
 
Among the scattered works that do explore the topic, there is little consensus. 
Historically, Boberg-Fazlic and Sharp (2013) show that while overall rates of social 
mobility were fairly constant in Britain between 1350-1850, there is ‘plentiful 
evidence’ that mobility was greater in the north and significantly lower in the south - 
particularly the south-east. Yet work on the contemporary UK paints a different 
picture. Paterson and Iannelli’s (2007) work, for example, punctures romantic 
narratives of Wales and Scotland as more ‘open’ societies. They show that rates of 
intergenerational occupational mobility have been broadly similar across all of 
Britain’s ‘home nations’ since the beginning of the 20th century.  
 
Arguably the only sustained engagement with regionally-specific social mobility has 
focused on the role of London. This literature can be grouped into two competing 
strands. The first, perhaps more dominant, argument maintains that London is the 
‘engine-room’ of British social mobility. Formational here are Fielding’s (1992; 
1995) landmark studies, which identified London and the South-East as an ‘escalator’ 
region providing disproportionately high opportunities for intra-generational social 
mobility for young in-migrants in the 1970s and 80s. A similar argument has also 
emerged in terms of inter-generational educational mobility, with a number of studies 
demonstrating that pupils from working-class origins perform better in London 
schools than any other part of the UK – dubbed the ‘London Effect’ (Greaves et al, 
2014; Blanden et al 2015). And even more recently this celebratory narrative has 
featured heavily in the SMCP’s publication of a regional ‘social mobility index’. This 
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classification, which ranks local authority districts in England according to a range of 
proxy measures of inter- and intra-generational educational and occupational 
mobility, finds that Central London authorities lead the country on all measures of 
social mobility (SMCP, 2015; 2016).      
 
This notion of a transformatory ‘London Effect’ has been challenged in sociological 
work, however (Cunningham and Savage, 2015; Hall and Savage, 2015). Using data 
from the GBCS, Savage and Cunningham (2015: 321) argue that contemporary 
London is not so much an escalator region but an ‘elite metropolitan vortex’ – ‘a 
space where the coming together of intense economic, social and cultural resources 
enable the crystallization of a particular elite social class formation’ with ‘an 
increasing propensity toward self-recruitment’. Others point to low mobility rates in 
occupational sectors located chiefly in Central London, such as banking and finance 
(Sutton Trust, 2014; Author A et al, 2015). Moreover, Ashley et al (2016) argue that 
particularly strong ‘barriers to access’ exist for those from working-class backgrounds 
seeking to enter City (of London) investment banks. In particular, the authors 
highlight how recruiters routinely misrecognize as ‘talent’ classed performances of 
‘cultural display’. For example, recruiters seek a ‘polished’ appearance, strong 
debating skills, and a confident manner, traits the authors argue can be closely traced 
back to middle class socialisation.   
 
It is clear, then, that there is little scholarly consensus on the inter-regional dynamics 
of occupational social mobility in the UK. Moreover, the research that does exist is 
restricted by a sole focus on who ‘gets in’ (i.e. occupational entry) rather than 
investigating whether there are inequalities in who ‘gets on’ (i.e. class-origin pay 
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gaps). In this regard, it is more fruitful to look to the extensive feminist literature on 
inter-regional variation in the gender pay gap. This work has consistently 
demonstrated that the gender pay gap is significantly higher in London and the South-
East, and significantly lower in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (Olsen, 2010; 
Olsen and Walby, 2004). More specifically, while the gender pay gap has fallen 
consistently since 1975 in most parts of the UK, in London and the South-East it has 
effectively stopped falling since 1991. Stewart (2014) shows that this regional 
difference is largely driven by a particularly acute gender pay gap in the top third of 
the wage distribution in London.    
 
Considering the extensive attention paid to the spatial patterning of the gender pay 
gap, it is curious that no work has examined whether similar inter-regional 
inequalities exist in relation to class origin. One explanation is that, traditionally, 
the UK has lacked the kind of large-scale representative data needed to conduct 
this kind of analysis (i.e. containing large sample sizes and detailed social origin 
data). Yet from 2014 onwards the UK Labour Force Survey, the largest 
representative sample of employment in the UK, has begun to include detailed 
questions on parental occupation. Taking advantage of this new data we here pool 
data from the 2014 and 2015 LFS to provide the most detailed analysis to-date of 
regional earnings inequality by class origin.  
 
First, we examine the spatial dispersion and class composition of higher 
professional and managerial jobs in the UK. This demonstrates that contra to the 
celebratory policy narrative of the ‘London Effect’, there is actually a striking 
overrepresentation of those from privileged backgrounds in the Capital. We then 
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show that this pattern of inter-regional class inequality persists within high-status 
occupations, with Central London in particular characterized by a large class pay 
gap that persists even after controlling for a variety of variables thought to affect 
earnings. Finally, we delve further into the Central London labour market to find 
that the class-origin pay disadvantage is particularly acute in banking and finance. 
This, we argue, indicates that the spatialisation of class in Britain is not just 
confined to residential place but is profoundly implicated in the reproduction of 
class inequality in occupational settings.        
 
 
Methodology 
As noted the LFS now provides detailed information about parental occupation. Drawing 
on this social origin variable we examine the parental occupations of respondents 
employed in Class 1 of the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) 
—comprising 63 individual “Higher managerial, administrative and professional 
occupations3”. Throughout the article we analyze divisions spatially, looking at those in 
NS-SEC 1 occupations who work in 14 different areas of the UK4. The first eight are 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland along with five official English ‘regions’ denoted 
by the UK government. The other six separate the remaining English regions into their 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan components, as NS-SEC 1 jobs are disproportionately 
situated in large urban areas. They thus distinguish Central London5 from the rest of 
London, Manchester from Merseyside and the Northwest6, and Birmingham and 
Metropolitan West Midlands from the rest of the Midlands.  
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In order to measure respondent’s social origin we refer to the LFS question asking 
respondents the occupation of their main earner parent when they were 147. We then 
group respondents’ social origin into the eight NS-SEC classes.8 In order to simplify 
our analyses, we consolidate these throughout the paper. Here we use a four-class 
scheme, comparing those with NS-SEC-1 origins (higher managers and professionals, 
whom we term inter-generationally stable), to NS-SEC 2 (lower managers and 
professionals, short-range mobile), NS-SEC 3, 4 and 5, (intermediate and clerical 
occupations9, mid-range mobile) and NS-SEC 6, 7 and 8 (routine and semi-routine 
occupations and those with no earning family member10, long-range mobile).  
 
In order to provide the most detailed picture of regional difference we pool data from 
nine quarters of the LFS from July-September 2013 to July-September 2015.  We then 
remove all those under 2311 and/or in full-time education from the analyses. We also omit 
those over 69, as the LFS collects data on those over 69 differently, since most people in 
this age group have moved into retirement. This leaves 7534 respondents employed in 
NS-SEC 1 who have an identified work region and class origin information to assign to 
one of the above groups, and 5638 who also have earnings information12. 
 
The Regional Class Composition of NS-SEC 1  
We begin our analysis with a descriptive portrait of the spatial distribution of NS-SEC 
1 jobs in Britain. Table 1 demonstrates that although high-status occupations are 
distributed throughout the UK, there are important regional differences. In particular, 
Central London has a considerable overrepresentation of NS-SEC 1 jobs; 35.5% of 
the workforce is employed in these occupations compared with only 12.5% of the 
whole UK.  Moreover, NS-SEC 1 jobs are significantly better remunerated in Central 
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London – earning on average 44 per cent (or £20,500 per year) more than those 
situated elsewhere in the UK. This is reflective of a wider and growing pattern of 
cross-regional earnings inequality between Central London and the rest of the UK 
(Stewart, 2011), partly explained by the different composition of high-status 
occupations in Central London and the higher returns to these occupations 
(Monastiriotis, 2004). 
     
Table 1 here 
 
Next we examine the class origins of those in NS-SEC 1 in different parts of the UK. 
Figure 1 shows two key findings. First, people in higher managerial and professional 
occupations are disproportionately drawn from privileged occupational backgrounds 
in all areas of the UK: while those from NS-SEC 1 backgrounds constitute only 15 
per cent of the general population, this figure is considerably higher among NS-SEC 1 
employees in every region (apart from Northern Ireland). Second, despite the overall 
overrepresentation of the privileged, there are important regional differences in the 
social composition of NS-SEC 1 jobs: the regions in the south of England, and 
particularly Central London, contain a high concentration of respondents in NS-SEC 
1 jobs who are from NS-SEC 1 backgrounds. For example, 34 per cent of those 
working in top jobs in Central London are drawn from higher professional and 
managerial backgrounds, while in Northern Ireland this figure is 10 per cent. This is 
suggestive of a process Savage et al (2015) term the ‘bees round a honey-pot’ effect: 
the more economic capital is associated with a specific job, the more likely it is that it 
draws those from privileged backgrounds13. 
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Figure 1 here 
 
The Regional Class Pay Gap 
While our analysis so far demonstrates important regional variations in the class 
composition and apparent ‘openness’ of NS-SEC 1, it does not tell us whether there 
are also regional variations in how those from lower origins fare relative to others 
within NS-SEC 1 occupations. In previous work (Authors A and B; Year B) we have 
used the 2014 LFS data to demonstrate that there is a significant ‘class origin pay gap’ 
in NS-SEC 1, even when we control for a range of factors thought to affect earnings. 
Deepening this here, we first examine whether this pay gap remains when we pool 
LFS data from 2014 and 2015. Table 2 thus shows a series of nested linear 
regressions that examine the class-origin pay gap in gross weekly earnings when we 
control for five sets of independent variables that previous sociological research has 
identified as potential sources of income inequality in the UK. In the base model we 
include controls for gender, ethnicity, age, hours worked and the quarter in which the 
respondent gave earnings information14. In Model 2 we add measures of education: 
highest qualification (Gregg et al., 2013; Jerrim, 2012; Walker and Zhu, 2010) and 
degree classification; Model 3 adds measures of  human capital15 – training, job 
tenure and health (Becker, 1962; Coleman, 1988; Groot and Oosterbeek, 1994); 
Model 4 adds elements of work context, such as working in London (Cunningham 
and Savage, 2015), in big firms (Ashley, 2015) and in the private versus public sector 
(ONS, 2014); and finally, Model 5 adds dummy variables for each of the individual 
occupations in NS-SEC 116.  
 
Table 2 here 
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Table 2 shows that even when we control for all these variables, a significant class 
pay gap remains for the mid and long-range upwardly mobile. For example those 
from working-class origins (NS-SEC 6-8) who are otherwise similar - in every way 
we can measure - to those from privileged (NS-SEC 1) origins are still earning, on 
average, £103 per week (£5375 per year)17 less within the UK’s top occupations. 
Significantly, Model 5 in Table 2 also indicates that the class-origin pay gap is only 
fractionally less than the gender pay gap in the same data for NS-SEC 1 
occupations18.  
 
Next we apply a geographical lens to this analysis, comparing the earnings of 
respondents in NS-SEC 1 occupations from stable backgrounds to those who have 
been mid-, and long-range upwardly mobile19 in 14 areas of the UK. We show this in 
two ways. First, Table 3 presents the results of separate regressions for each region 
with only demographic controls applied and gross weekly earnings as the dependent 
variable. This demonstrates very clearly that the class pay gap is not a geographically-
isolated phenomenon. Instead, there are statistically significant pay gaps for at least 
one of our socially mobile groups in 10 of the 14 regions. These gaps are generally 
largest for the long-range upwardly mobile, particularly in the country’s two most 
populous metropolitan areas - London and Birmingham.   
 
Table 3 here 
 
In Table 4 we move to disentangle potential sources of these regional class-origin 
income differences, reporting the coefficients for models once all controls have been 
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added (the same as those in Model 5 of Table 2). It is also worth noting that here we 
use regional income percentiles in NS-SEC 1 as the dependent variable. A percentile 
score of 80, for example, means that person is earning more than 80 per cent of those 
in our sample in higher managerial and professional occupations who work in the 
same region as s/he does.  This allows for comparisons that would otherwise be 
obscured by the much higher average earnings, and much wider distribution of 
earnings, of those in London.    
 
Table 4 demonstrates that the class pay gap persists, even when we apply our full 
battery of controls, in 8 regions for the long-range mobile and 2 for the mid-range 
mobile. Again we see large gaps in Metropolitan West Midlands, the North East, 
Merseyside and Scotland. It is worth connecting this to data in Figure A1, which 
shows how those from privileged origins in each of these four regions are also 
disproportionately overrepresented in high-status jobs within their region. Advantaged 
origins in these areas, then, appears to be associated with particularly high relative 
chances of access and progression in the top occupations.   
 
However, significantly, the class pay gap only remains statistically significant both 
before and after controls, and for both the mid- and long-range mobile, in Central 
London. It is also largest – in monetary terms – here. For example, the average class 
pay gap for those from working-class backgrounds in Central London is nearly 10 
percentile points, which translates to an average difference of £10,660 a year. This is 
worth underlining. People working in the heart of London who are upwardly mobile 
but otherwise similar to those from privileged backgrounds - in terms of education, 
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demographics, human capital, work context and specific occupation - are earning 
significantly less.    
 
Table 4 here 
 
Taken together, these findings present a strikingly different portrait of social mobility 
than that of the progressive ‘London Effect’ trumpeted in the SMCP’s ‘Social 
Mobility Index’. Of course the LFS sample is too old to capture recent improvements 
in educational mobility within the Capital, but our results do at least suggest that the 
emerging generation of high-achieving working-class children may face particularly 
strong barriers to progression, even controlling for their educational attainment, if and 
when they attempt to get on in top occupations in Central London.  
   
Despite this it is worth noting three caveats to our analysis so far. First, despite 
significant pay gaps within many regions there are few statistically significant 
differences between class-origin coefficients for different regions. In other words, 
beyond Central London there is no clear geographical patterning to the class pay 
gap20. Second, there are a few work regions - namely East of England and Manchester 
– where we find no discernible class-origin pay gap. Further work is clearly needed to 
continue to unpack these regional differences but it is striking that again they 
confound the SMCP’s ‘Social Mobility Index’ which ranks the East of England as a 
distinct mobility ‘cold spot’ (SMCP, 2016).  
 
Finally, one further limitation of our analysis here is that the LFS data cannot tell us 
whether these class pay gaps are connected to flows of geographical mobility. To 
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address this we therefore draw on Miles and Leguina’ s (forthcoming) analysis of the 
2008 National Child Development Study which looks at the intersection of social and 
geographical mobility. They find that across the UK the upwardly mobile are as, or 
less, likely than the intergenerationally stable (in the service class) to have been 
geographically mobile. In London, for example, 57% of the stable service class is 
from London and 67% of the long-range mobile are from London. Thus while 
absolute rates of migration into London remain higher than other parts of the UK 
(Champion et al 2014), we have no reason to suspect that the class pay gap in London 
is being driven by factors relating to the regional identities of migrants from working-
class backgrounds.    
 
Financial London; the Apex of Class-Origin Pay Disadvantage? 
Our findings so far demonstrate that the most consistent21 and largest (in monetary 
terms) class pay gap is found in Central London. In this section we interrogate this 
further by, first, examining the earnings distribution (by class origin) of those working 
in Central London. Figure 2 thus separates average earnings into quintiles and reveals 
the class composition of each of these five groups. Significantly, this demonstrates 
that the stable are significantly over-represented in the top two quintiles of the income 
distribution and the long-range upwardly mobile are significantly over-represented in 
the bottom two quintiles. This points toward two possible explanations for the Central 
London pay gap (which are not mutually exclusive): first, it may be that the socially 
mobile in Central London face a ‘class ceiling’ that keeps them from reaching the 
most senior (and therefore highest-paying) positions in their occupational fields22. 
Second, it may be that the gap is driven by occupational sorting – with the stable 
simply more likely to enter higher-paying sectors.  
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Figure 2 here 
 
While the LFS lacks the kind of job title or position data needed to adequately 
examine the class ceiling hypothesis it does allow us to look at the sectoral specificity 
of the Capital’s labour market. Table 5 thus illustrates that the highest-paying sector 
in Central London is banking and finance23. Average earnings here are £94,000 a year 
(versus £64,000 elsewhere in Central London).   
 
Table 5 here 
 
The findings in Figure 2 and Table 5 can also be connected to recent research 
demonstrating that London’s finance sector24 is disproportionately dominated by 
those from privileged backgrounds (Sutton Trust, 2014; Author A et al, 2015; Ashley 
et al, 2016). While this work is confined to issues of occupational access, Ashley et al 
(2016) conclude by speculating that one plausible implication of the skew in entry is 
that individuals from less privileged backgrounds may continue encounter 
‘disadvantages throughout their career’ (Ashley et al, 2016: 48-50).  
 
Next we interrogate this hypothesis, examining the class composition, and average 
earnings percentiles (after controls), of those from different backgrounds working in 
Central London’s financial sector. We contrast this group to those in Central London 
who do not work in financial services, and to those who work outside Central London 
who do – and then who do not - work in banking and finance. Figure 3 echoes recent 
qualitative work in pointing to the marginally higher proportion of those from 
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professional and managerial backgrounds employed in Central London’s financial 
sector compared to other areas of the Capital.  
 
Figure 3 here 
 
More significantly, though, Figure 425 also tentatively suggests substantial differences 
in the Central London class pay gap depending on whether respondents work in 
banking and finance. While sample sizes here are somewhat limiting, it is striking that 
the long-range upwardly mobile in banking and finance earn 18 percentile points (on 
average £26,000 a year) less than those from higher managerial and professional 
backgrounds, whereas the mobile working elsewhere in Central London earn only 8 
percentile points (on average £4,000 a year) less than their intergenerationally stable 
peers.   
 
Figure 4 here 
 
There are three further observations to be made here; first, banking and finance are 
not the only drivers of the pay gap in Central London – a statistically significant gap 
remains for those working in other sectors; second, the strong London pay gap in 
finance is not a sector-wide phenomenon - there are no significant earnings 
differences for mobile individuals working in the same sector outside Central London. 
Finally, and related to this, it is worth connecting the average earnings data in Figure 
2 to the class pay gaps in Figure 4. This demonstrates that not only is the class pay 
gap highest in the highest-paying region but it is at its very peak in the highest-paying 
sector of the highest-paying region. This suggests that London’s finance sector – 
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dominated by The City (of London) – may represent the distinct spatial and sectoral 
apex of the class-origin pay gap in Britain. It also lends tentative support to 
Cunningham and Savage’s (2015) thesis that Central London has become an ‘elite 
metropolitan vortex’, where those from privileged backgrounds are able to dominate 
access to the highest economic rewards. Our data certainly indicates that the closer 
one gets – geographically and occupationally - to Britain’s highest paying jobs, the 
more class origin appears to matter.  
 
The data at hand cannot explain why the class pay gap appears so concentrated in 
financial London, however. Indeed it may be that it is (at least partly) explained by 
resources associated with class origin that we cannot measure here - such as parental 
income and wealth, powerful social networks, elite private school or university 
attendance, and cultural tastes or practices with widely shared legitimacy. We also 
believe there may be occupationally-specific mechanisms at play. In particular, it may 
be that the gap is associated with differences in the types of banking and finance firms 
where the stable and the mobile work, and the types of roles they take up within such 
firms. There is evidence, for example, that those from privileged backgrounds are 
particularly over-represented in the The City’s biggest, most prestigious and better-
paying ‘blue-chip’ firms (Cook et al., 2012; Ashley and Empson, 2012). Similarly, 
Ashley et al’s (2016) recent work demonstrates that within The City’s investment 
banks those from ‘non-privileged backgrounds’ face particular barriers in accessing 
the highest-paying ‘front-office roles’ - which mainly constitute the revenue-
generating sales and advisory functions of banks. Here, perceptions of individual 
‘image’ and ‘polish’ are paramount to recruitment processes, with the embodied 
cultural capital (legitimate forms of speech, accent, mannerisms and dress) possessed 
by upper middle-class candidates considered essential for convincing clients of one’s 
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claim to expertise. Moreover, Ashley et al (2016) argue that, to some extent, the 
valorisation of these characteristics reflects a historical legacy from a previous era 
when UK merchant banks were populated predominantly by alumni of major public 
schools and elite universities (Scott, 1991; McDowell, 1997). Characteristics 
associated with these previous incumbents, the authors argue, continue to shape and 
narrow perceptions of acceptable ‘professionalism’ into the present day, whereas such 
expectations are far less evident in other, less well-paid, roles within the same banks. 
 
Conclusion 
The class-origin pay gap represents a powerful and previously undetected form of 
inequality within Britain’s higher professional and managerial occupations. This is 
not an isolated local effect but instead, as our analysis here demonstrates, is visible 
across most of the UK. Yet it is also clear that the most robust concentration of this 
inequality is found in Central London. Not only is the composition of top jobs here 
disproportionately skewed toward the socially privileged, but those from working-
class backgrounds who do gain positions face particularly acute barriers to 
progression, resulting in average earnings 10 percentile points lower than colleagues 
who have come from privileged backgrounds. Moreover, exploring this London-effect 
further, our analysis suggests that class-origin pay inequality may be most acute in the 
lucrative banking and finance jobs clustered in the City.  
 
These findings, we believe, demonstrate that when it comes to understanding how 
class origin shapes occupational outcomes, place matters. In particular, we hope this 
research may revitalise a strand of work dedicated to exploring the spatialisation of 
class.  While this work has typically considered residential location and class 
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destinations, our work demonstrates the importance of occupational location and class 
origin. Put simply, in high-status occupations the importance and meaning of class 
origin depend significantly on where one works. This is clearly indicated by our 
finding that a working-class background is associated with considerably more 
earnings disadvantage for those working in Central London compared to working in 
Manchester or Norwich, even within the same set of high-status occupations.   
 
The drivers of this London-specific effect remain largely unexplained and follow-up 
work is urgently needed. Drawing on recent directions in ‘glass ceiling’ research, we 
stress the particular need for qualitative work that can better elucidate how occupational 
inequalities play out in specific spatial contexts. This feminist literature has highlighted 
how factors such as mentorship (Elacqua et al., 2009), pay negotiation (McGovern et al., 
2007) and ‘bonus cultures’ (Olsen, 2010) tend to work in the favour of men in large 
metropolitan firms, and we believe these may also be important for unravelling ‘class 
ceiling’ effects. 
  
It is also important to acknowledge the limitations of our analysis – most notably the 
absence of place of origin and the small sample sizes when we mine down to 
occupational sectors within regions. Moreover, our results can only provide a snapshot of 
regional social mobility. For example, Robson (2006; 2009) has shown that between 
1975 and 2001 the growth of the share of employment in the service sector (NS-SEC 1 
and 2) has been greatest in regions such as the North-East and the West Midlands that 
traditionally had the lowest national share, resulting in a convergence in the regional 
distribution of service sector employment. These changes have important implications for 
understanding our findings. In particular, the relative disadvantage faced by the upwardly 
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mobile may vary significantly according to the size and composition of NS-SEC 1 
employment within their region when they entered, and the particular, occupationally-
specific, cohort they were part of.  
 
We believe our work has two important implications for scholars interested in social 
mobility and spatial inequality. First, these findings puncture the celebratory air 
surrounding the recent ‘London Effect’ discourse on social mobility. While London 
may well be leading recent educational mobility metrics, we would argue that the 
long-term realization of these increases in mobility may be seriously undermined if 
emerging generations face the same kind of barriers to earnings progression – which 
persists even controlling for educational attainment - experienced by our sample here. 
Indeed, we believe our findings echo Cunningham and Savage (Cunningham and 
Savage, 2015) in pointing toward the development of distinctive patterns of elite 
closure in Inner London, with those from privileged backgrounds able to monopolize 
the Capital’s highest earning jobs. We would thus stress the need for policymakers to 
take a more spatially-sensitive approach to social mobility that recognizes the 
particular inequalities that exist in the elite London labour market.    
  
Second, we hope our analysis will encourage other quantitative mobility researchers 
to take issues of space and inter-regional variation more seriously. Very often large-
scale mobility research suffers from ‘methodological nationalism’ and implicitly 
assumes that mobility effects are occurring in the same way throughout the country 
under investigation. One pragmatic reason driving this is that, traditionally, 
researchers have simply lacked the large-scale representative data needed to utilise a 
more spatially granular lens. However, increasingly, new sources such as tax data in 
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the U.S (Chetty et al., 2014) are emerging to allow us to bridge this gap. Taking 
advantage of these new empirical materials, or innovations in existing data sets as we 
do here, is likely to reveal specific occupational and spatial confluences of 
inequality — such as financial London — that are profoundly important for 
understanding precisely where class disadvantage is taking place.     
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1The relationship between parent’s and child’s class position is often described using 
spatial metaphors, most prominently ‘mobility’.  In order to minimize confusion, in 
this paper mobility will only refer moves between class positions, rather than 
geographic moves. 
2 The salience of intra-occupational inequality has long been demonstrated in relation to 
gender and ethnicity, with studies consistently highlighting the hidden barriers, or ‘glass 
ceilings’, faced by women and ethnic minorities in high-status occupations. 
3 Occupation is not the only criterion for inclusion in NS-SEC 1; the scheme also 
takes into account aspects of respondents’ role in their organization, such as whether 
they own their own business and how many people they manage. 
4 As the LFS does not collect data on individual place of origin, we are not able to 
examine the relationship between social and spatial mobility 
5 Central London is defined as a sub-region of London and comprises the boroughs 
of Camden, Islington, Kensington and 
Chelsea, Lambeth, Southwark, Westminster and the City of London. 
6 Although Merseyside is a metropolitan county, the number of respondents in NS-
SEC 1 jobs whom also have income data is too low to separate it out as a separate 
region in our analysis 
7 Some studies (Batty et al, 2005) have demonstrated recall problems in this measure 
of parental class  
8 We use Table 10 from http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-
method/classifications/current-standard-classifications/soc2010/soc2010-volume-3-
ns-sec--rebased-on-soc2010--user-manual/index.html at ONS, the “simplified 
scheme” to match parents’ 4-digit SOC2010 occupational codes to the analytic NS-
SEC categorization.  
9 This includes occupations which are normally self-employed and technically skilled 
and craft occupations. 
10 People who said there was no one earning in their household at age 14. 
11 Although it is standard in mobility table analyses to only look at those age 30 or 35 
or over, we include the widest reasonable age range because we are interested in the 
composition of NS-SEC 1, not mobility chances by origin. 
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12 We find no relationship between class-origin and missing income data in our 
sample. For example, 72.3% of the intergenerationally stable report their income 
whereas among the long-range mobile the figure is 74.8%. In terms of region, the 
only meaningful exception is Northern Ireland where 10% fewer people report their 
income.    
13 The apparent openness of NS-SEC 1 in some regions such as Scotland, 
Metropolitan West Midlands and the North-East is complicated by Table A1 and 
Figure A1 in the Appendix: the class-origin composition of people in any destination 
varies widely across the regions of the United Kingdom, so many of these regions’ 
NS-SEC 1 workforces are particularly unrepresentative of the class-origin 
composition of their region as a whole. Thus those from privileged origins in these 
regions have a much high odds of reproducing their advantage relative to those from 
less advantaged origins within the region. For example, privileged-origin people make 
up about 18% of NS-SEC 1 positions in the North East, but under 10% of people in 
any NS-SEC class. 
14  The LFS tracks respondents over five quarters, and asks their earnings in their first 
and fifth quarter of participation in the survey.  We use respondents’ Wave 1 reported 
earnings, and all variables in regressions are also from each respondent’s first wave, 
with the exception of social origin, which was asked of all respondents in July 2014 
and July 2015. 
15 Higher values on each of these health scales indicate greater levels of health 
problems, see Appendix for more detail. 
16 See Appendix for sources and distributions of all variables used in regressions. 
Individual occupation coefficients not shown in Table 3. 
17 We derive this figure from an identical regression model with untransformed 
weekly earnings rather than regional income percentile as the dependent variable 
18 However, it is important to remember that upwardly mobile women face a 
significant ‘double disadvantage’ based on both class origin and gender. Long range 
mobile women, for example, have predicted earnings of about 25% less than 
otherwise-similar intergenerationally stable men (See Authors B and A, 2016 for 
further discussion).  
19 As there is no significant pay-gap for the short-range mobile in the UK as a whole 
we therefore exclude these respondents from this part of the analysis. 
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20 The class pay gap for the socially mobile in Central London is statistically 
significantly different to that in Manchester, Wales, The Midlands, Yorkshire, The 
Southeast and Northern Ireland    
21 We have modelled class-origin earnings gaps by region in several different ways: 
with variation in coding in the control variables, with different numbers of categories 
for the class-origin measure, and with different waves and subsamples of the LFS 
data. All models consistently return negative coefficients for most regions, but the 
size and statistical significance of those coefficients also fluctuates a good deal across 
model specifications; only in Central London do we consistently see statistically 
significant and substantively meaningful class-origin pay gaps, net of all controls, for 
all mid- and long-range mobile groups.  
22  To further interrogate the ‘class ceiling’ hypothesis we would stress the need for 
longitudinal data that that can go beyond the static measures of earnings we use here 
to better elucidate intra-occupational trajectories and their relationship to class origin. 
23 For this analysis, industries are grouped somewhat differently than they are in the 
regressions above, based on the density of different sectors in Central London; see 
Appendix for full details. 
24 The seven most common occupations in this sector, making up 63% of its Central 
London workforce, are financial managers and directors, brokers, business and 
financial project managers, chartered accountants, insurance underwriters, IT 
managers and chief executives and senior officials.  
25 These figures were produced using coefplot in Stata (Jann 2014), and display the 
point estimates of coefficients for origins, as well as the 90 (thicker lines) and 95 per 
cent confidence intervals (thinner lines).  
 
